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The Regulatory 
Responsibility Bill 
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Richard Ekins
The principles of responsible regulation
The central clause in the taskforce’s draft 
bill is clause 7, entitled ‘Principles’. The 
first sub-clause sets out 11 ‘principles of 
responsible regulation’ in paragraphs 
(a)–(k), grouped under six subheadings. 
The second echoes section 5 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and 
states that ‘Any incompatibility with the 
principles is justified to the extent that it 
is reasonable and can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.’ 
It is these principles, duly limited, that are 
the focus of the three mechanisms. 
Many of the principles are drawn 
from the Legislation Advisory Committee 
Guidelines and Cabinet Manual. The 
taskforce stresses the orthodoxy of the 
principles, saying it aimed ‘to provide a 
simplified and streamlined set of criteria 
that accord with and reflect broadly 
accepted principles of good legislation 
rather than novel principles’ (paragraph 
1.11; the same phrase, minus the final four 
words, is used at paragraph 4.25). However, 
not all are orthodox – the taskforce has 
modified some of them. And many are 
not fit to be justiciable. I now outline the 
principles, noting what is heterodox and 
what should not be justiciable, arguing 
that they do not all warrant affirmation, 
either in their own right (as principles 
of good legislation) or as ‘constitutional’ 
principle.
Rule of law
The bill affirms the rule of law (paragraph 
(a)), but happily the taskforce has avoided 
one obvious trap. That is, the bill specifies 
four aspects of the rule of law. This is 
preferable to affirming ‘the rule of law’ in 
the abstract, for many vague conceptions 
of the ideal abound. The third aspect 
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is that every person is equal before the 
law. The report argues that this concerns 
equality in the administration of law 
rather than substantive equality, which 
would preclude unjustifiable distinctions 
amongst persons. The report eschews this 
broader right to equality on the grounds 
that it was considered and rejected in 
enacting the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act. The taskforce places (far too) much 
weight on the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
argument that ‘equality under the law’ 
introduces substantive equality but 
‘equality before the law’ does not (Andrews 
v. Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1 
SCR 143). Specifying this aspect of the rule 
of law is risky. It is perfectly conceivable 
that the courts will, either now or in 
ten years time, interpret the phrase to 
introduce substantive equality and so to 
require judicial assessment of the merit of 
any distinction made amongst classes of 
person.
Liberties
The bill also affirms liberty, paragraph (b) 
stating that legislation should:
not diminish a person’s liberty, 
personal security, freedom of choice 
or action, or rights to own, use, and 
dispose of property, except as is 
necessary to provide for, or protect, 
any such liberty, freedom, or right of 
another person.
Very many legislative acts diminish a 
person’s liberty or freedom of choice. 
This principle bars the imposition of 
duties unless those duties are necessary 
to protect ‘any such liberty, freedom, 
or right of another’ (the phrase omits 
‘personal security’, although the later 
discussion, at paragraph 4.53, implies that 
this is an oversight). Imagine an act like 
the Bakeshop Act 1896 (New York), which 
prohibits any person from employing 
another to work in a bakery for more than 
10 hours per day or 60 hours per week. 
That act would depart from paragraph 
(b), for it restricts the freedom of contract 
of employer (and employee), and is not 
necessary to protect any existing liberty 
or freedom of the employee (or any other 
person). The legislators might attempt, 
per clause 7(2), to justify their act by 
reference to the health of the worker or the 
need to protect him or her from economic 
exploitation. It would be open to the courts 
to consider this rationale and to decide 
that the legislation is an unjustifiable 
limit on liberty. This is precisely what 
took place in the infamous United States 
Supreme Court decision Lochner v. New 
York 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Enacting this 
principle opens the policy of almost every 
statute up to review on Lochner grounds, 
with that review informing interpretation 
and declarations (on which more below). 
There are very good reasons for courts not 
to carry out this kind of review.
Taking of property
The bill also states, in paragraph (c), that 
legislation should ‘not take or impair … 
property’ unless this is necessary in the 
public interest and full compensation 
is paid, such compensation to be paid if 
practicable by those who benefit from the 
taking. This principle seems to have been 
the taskforce’s main concern – its five 
examples of bad law making each concern 
property rights (paragraphs 2.9-2.11). 
The Legislation Advisory Committee 
objected to Rodney Hide’s original 
Regulatory Responsibility Bill in part 
because that bill purported to reflect 
orthodox legal principle but in truth 
introduced an unorthodox conception 
of compensation for impairment, as 
distinct from expropriation, of property 
rights. Paragraph (c) is an improvement 
on its precursor in the original bill, clause 
6(2)(e), which proscribed taking or 
impairing property save for an essential 
public interest and on payment of full 
compensation. However, this paragraph is 
still objectionable. It conflates takings and 
impairment. The effect is that limiting 
how one uses property attracts full 
compensation. The taskforce argues in 
paragraph 4.63 that severe impairment of 
property rights is tantamount to a taking. 
This is not true, or at least not always 
true: banning a certain kind of dangerous 
vehicle from the road constitutes a severe 
impairment of property rights but is not a 
taking of those rights for communal use. 
In any event, the taskforce moves from its 
premise that severe impairment is a taking 
to the conclusion in the terms of clause 7(c) 
that there should be ‘full compensation for 
the taking or impairment’ – no mention 
of severity here. 
The point of the principle is to make 
it very expensive to limit how property 
owners may act, for any property owner 
who suffers loss from regulatory change 
is entitled to be made whole. Thus, if 
Parliament wishes to ban dangerous 
weapons, it must buy them. Legislation 
imposing mandatory closing times on 
certain pubs would be an impairment 
attracting compensation. And legislation 
criminalising prostitution would arguably 
be a taking of the goodwill of what would 
otherwise have been lawful brothels (the 
report in paragraph 4.60 takes goodwill 
to be property). This principle smuggles 
in a doctrine of regulatory takings that is 
foreign to our constitution. Law makers 
should consider the impact that legislation 
has on persons and their property, but this 
assessment is politically contentious and 
should not be justiciable. I note in passing 
that the taskforce’s requirement that 
compensation should be paid by those 
who benefit from the taking is entirely 
novel (paragraph 4.62).
Taxes and charges
Paragraph (d) states that legislation should 
‘not impose, or authorise the imposition 
of, a tax except by or under an Act’. This 
Paragraph (d) states that 
legislation should ‘not 
impose, or authorise the 
imposition of, a tax except 
by or under an Act’. This 
is orthodox but largely 
redundant for ... section 22 
of the Constitution Act 1986 
already renders invalid any 
tax that is not imposed by 
or under an act. 
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is orthodox but largely redundant for, as 
the report notes at paragraph 4.67, section 
22 of the Constitution Act 1986 already 
renders invalid any tax that is not imposed 
by or under an act. Paragraph (e), which 
concerns charges, is less orthodox. It goes 
beyond the truth that charges should be 
limited to actual cost recovery, instead 
introducing the novel idea that charges 
should be proportionate to the benefits 
the payer receives. This would rule out, 
for example, a charge on manufacturers to 
meet the costs of a public inspectorate, the 
purpose of which is to benefit consumers. 
Further, this paragraph limits charges 
to ‘the costs of efficiently providing the 
goods or service’, which seems designed 
to limit actual cost recovery and to 
enable argument that a proposed service, 
function or power should be carried out 
by an ‘efficient’ (that is, lower cost) private 
provider.
The role of the courts
Paragraph (f) affirms the superiority of 
the courts in interpreting legislation. This 
is unremarkable but does affirm judicial 
supremacy in settling the scope and 
meaning of the principles of responsible 
regulation. Paragraph (g) states that if 
legislation authorises a minister or other 
public body or official to make decisions 
adverse to any person’s right or liberty, 
the legislation should ‘provide a right 
of appeal on the merits against those 
decisions to a court or other independent 
body’. This principle is novel: there is no 
general entitlement to an appeal on the 
merits in our constitution. The principle 
also has a very broad scope, perhaps 
extending to delegated law making itself, 
and ignores the legitimacy of decision 
making by ministers.
Good law making
The final four paragraphs set out 
the principles of ‘Good law-making’. 
Paragraph (h) states that legislation 
should not be made unless there has 
been consultation. Contra the report, 
there is no general duty of consultation 
in our law. Further, it is extraordinary 
and quite contrary to the Bill of Rights 
1688 that on this principle the adequacy 
of the parliamentary process itself is open 
to legal argument and judicial ruling. 
The remaining three principles amount 
to the truism that one should not make 
law unless there is good reason to make 
law. Paragraph (i) states that legislation 
should not be made (or introduced to the 
House of Representatives) unless there 
has been a careful evaluation of the issue, 
the existing law, the public interest, the 
relevant options (including non-legislative 
options), the identity of winners and losers 
and foreseeable consequences. I agree. I 
doubt, however, that policy makers often 
propose and adopt legislation in any other 
way (although the taskforce itself violates 
this principle). Their analysis may be hasty 
or weak, but that is different. 
Paragraph (j) states that legislation 
should produce benefits that outweigh 
its costs. This is unobjectionable if it is 
understood to be just a vague direction 
to consider costs. However, if policy 
makers and judges take it to enjoin cost-
benefit analysis then it is dangerous. The 
common good is not an aggregate capable 
of calculation. The injunction to weigh 
costs and benefits makes it likely that 
quantifiable outputs will loom too large 
in the law-making process. The report’s 
reference to maximal net public benefit 
suggests as much (paragraph 4.84) and 
the taskforce’s analysis of its own bill is not 
encouraging. In the final section of part 
2 of its report, the taskforce purports to 
weigh costs and benefits. The focus is on 
economic benefits, weighed against actual 
compliance costs. This is objectionable 
because it ignores other reasons for good 
law making and non-economic objections 
to the proposal. Finally, paragraph (k) 
states that legislation should be the most 
effective, efficient and proportionate 
response to the issue. This is close to 
a truism, although it may (wrongly) 
preclude legislation that aims to support 
other arrangements.
The certification regime
The central mechanism for ensuring that 
legislation is compatible with the prin-
ciples (subject to reasonable limits per 
clause 7(2)) is the certification regime. 
Clauses 8 and 9 require various persons to 
certify whether the legislation is compat-
ible with each of the principles, and if not 
how it is incompatible and whether this is 
justified under clause 7(2). In respect of a 
government bill, the minister responsible 
for the bill and the chief executive of the 
public entity that will be responsible for 
administering the resulting act must cer-
tify the bill. For regulations (broadly un-
derstood), the minister responsible for the 
regulation, if any, and the chief executive 
of the public entity that will be responsi-
ble for administering it must each certify 
it before making it.
The chief executive does not have to 
state whether or why an incompatibility is 
justified if a minister also gives a certificate 
under clause 8. The reason for this, the 
report states, is that the minister is the 
appropriate person to judge whether a 
departure is justified (paragraph 4.106). 
The taskforce concludes that in such cases 
the chief executive’s role ‘is best limited 
to the proposal’s technical compliance 
with the principles set out in clause 7(1)’. 
However, the final two principles require 
the chief executive to certify whether he 
or she thinks the benefits outweigh the 
costs and whether the legislation is the 
most effective, efficient and proportionate 
response available. This means the chief 
executive must in effect certify whether 
he or she would enact this law. The 
certification regime thus promises to 
grossly politicise chief executives and to 
... certification is at best 
a modest component in 
a careful deliberative 
process; much more 
important are time 
to consider the detail 
of proposals and an 
opportunity for experts, 
interested parties and 
other legislators to be 
heard. 
Page 12 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 6, Issue 2 – May 2010
arm them to veto government policy in 
a way that is flatly inconsistent with our 
constitutional arrangements.
If the minister does not certify the 
legislation, the chief executive will be 
obliged to certify it in full. The taskforce 
opines that this will be rare (paragraph 
4.107) ‘as generally the power to make 
legislation will be interpreted not to 
delegate the power to make legislation 
inconsistent with the principles of 
responsible regulation’. If my analysis 
above of liberty and takings is sound, 
then the taskforce’s speculation is plainly 
unsound. Legislation will (and should) 
routinely authorise delegated law makers 
other than ministers to depart from the 
principles. 
It is deeply problematic to require chief 
executives to certify legislation. However, 
if one sets aside this problem, certification 
may seem unobjectionable: legislators 
should think carefully before proposing 
legislation. However, affirming these 
principles is likely to distort law making. 
The scheme is weighted against departures 
from the principles: it imposes a burden of 
proof on laws that limit liberty or impair 
property, for example. The principles are 
not obvious truths about what should 
be done. They at least require further 
reasoning and argument to specify them. 
Further, some of the principles, such as 
those concerning liberty, takings, charges 
and cost-benefit analysis, are contentious. 
Affirming these principles inevitably 
prioritises them, through salience if 
nothing else, over other values.
The bill demands that law makers 
give reasons when they depart from 
the principles. Legislators should give 
reasons for any legislative act, reasons that 
substantiate the claim to have made good 
law. More to the point, legislation should 
be made by way of a process that enables 
assertions about a proposal’s justification 
to be tested carefully. Unsound principles 
are likely to distort reasoning. Even if 
the principles are sound, certification is 
at best a modest component in a careful 
deliberative process; much more important 
are time to consider the detail of proposals 
and an opportunity for experts, interested 
parties and other legislators to be heard.
Declarations of incompatibility
The bill introduces judicial declarations of 
incompatibility as a mechanism to support 
certification. Clause 12 authorises the 
superior courts to declare that legislation 
is incompatible with the principles 
specified in sections 7(1)(a)–(h), unless 
the incompatibility is justified under 
section 7(2). The power is discretionary 
and is subject to a temporal limit: for ten 
years after the commencement of this bill 
the courts may only issue declarations in 
respect of statutes that post-date it. The 
point of the delay is to give law makers 
an incentive to revise the statute book 
before the ten-year period expires (this 
incentive is reinforced by a duty on public 
entities, per clause 16, to review relevant 
legislation). The power is modelled on 
section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 
(UK), not section 3(2) as the report states. 
Clause 13 of the bill makes clear that a 
declaration of incompatibility does not 
render the relevant legislation invalid. 
The taskforce is aware of the general 
reasons for courts to abstain from 
considering the merits of legislative 
choices. However, the report goes on to 
argue that the power to issue declarations 
‘is justified and necessary’ to ensure 
compliance (paragraph 4.121). The 
possibility of a judicial declaration, the 
report suggests, is valuable primarily 
because it will imprint on policy makers 
the importance of the principles and the 
need to take them seriously throughout the 
legislative process. If those principles ‘are 
demonstrably given careful consideration 
by policy-makers, the Taskforce considers 
that the Courts are likely to give 
substantial deference to the judgment 
of the policy-makers’ (paragraph 4.122). 
This is speculation. The courts may well 
review strictly, reasoning that Parliament 
has charged them to police irresponsible 
law making.
Oddly, while the report gestures towards 
the experience of the United Kingdom, 
it says only that the jurisdiction to issue 
declarations ‘has been used in a number of 
significant cases, including consideration 
of anti-terrorism provisions’ (paragraph 
4.118). This lack of detailed analysis 
is striking, for that experience would 
seem highly relevant to the taskforce’s 
proposals. The United Kingdom political 
authorities have repeatedly changed the 
law to conform to judicial declarations of 
incompatibility. This experience suggests 
that the proposed power might be very 
effective; however, it also suggests that 
the proposed power risks illegitimately 
prioritising judicial analysis of the merits 
of legislation. That is, Parliament may 
defer to the courts on questions that are 
its responsibility to answer.
The problems with the certification 
regime are compounded by the jurisdiction 
to declare legislation incompatible. 
This jurisdiction makes what should 
be arguable the object of authoritative 
judicial ruling. That is, the scope and 
meaning of the principles is settled by 
legal argument. The courts should not 
review legislation against these principles. 
Interestingly, the taskforce is aware of the 
problem. The bill excludes the final three 
principles (clause 7(1)(i)–(k)) from the 
scope of the jurisdiction. The reason for 
this is that ‘[t]he Taskforce considers that 
those issues are particularly unsuitable 
for judicial consideration, given the 
institutional limits of the adversarial 
process’ (paragraph 4.124). This argument 
proves too much. Determining whether 
legislation unreasonably limits liberty or 
property is equally unsuitable for judicial 
consideration, yet the draft bill authorises 
just such review. The danger of the 
jurisdiction is that it invites the courts to 
review the reasonableness of all legislation. 
The courts lack the competence for that 
task and yet citizens and legislators may 
The problems with the 
certification regime 
are compounded by the 
jurisdiction to declare 
legislation incompatible. 
This jurisdiction makes 
what should be arguable 
the object of authoritative 
judicial ruling.  
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defer uncritically to their judgment about 
the merits of the law. The jurisdiction may 
also consume time and resources which 
the courts ought to devote to adjudicating 
disputes and which the parties ought to 
devote directly to law reform.
The jurisdiction is plainly a tool for the 
wealthy and organised to contest policy 
outside of the political process. It is also 
an opportunity to reopen past decisions. 
The point of the delay in applying the 
jurisdiction to legislation that predates 
the bill is to prompt law makers to revise 
the statute book to avoid declarations of 
incompatibility. The implication is that 
law makers should identify and change 
legislation that, for example, unreasonably 
impaired property without compensation. 
This entails that law makers should either 
remove the impairment (the limitation 
on use) or compensate. Hence, if this bill 
is enacted, property owners will after ten 
years sue for a judicial declaration that 
legislation that predates the bill impaired 
their property without compensation. In 
other words, the jurisdiction arms property 
owners to reopen and to challenge the 
legitimacy of past regulatory takings. 
The interpretive direction
The bill introduces another supporting 
mechanism in clause 11, which states that 
‘[w]herever an enactment can be given 
a meaning that is compatible with the 
principles (after taking account of section 
7(2)), that meaning is to be preferred to 
any other meaning.’ This clause is not 
prominent in the scheme of the bill – it is 
not included in the purpose provision in 
clause 3 – or in the report at large. In the 
introduction to the report, the taskforce 
emphasises the jurisdiction to declare 
legislation incompatible (paragraphs 1.5, 
1.18–1.20), but mentions the interpretive 
direction only in passing. That one 
reference, in paragraph 1.20, is interesting 
for the report states that ‘the existing 
judicial review jurisdiction would be 
enlivened by an interpretation provision’.
In its commentary on clause 11, the 
report observes that the clause is adapted 
from section 6 of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990. The report states that this 
is preferable to alternative directives such 
as section 8 of the (UK) Human Rights 
Act (the reference should be to section 3). 
The taskforce reasons that the language 
they have adopted is more familiar to 
the New Zealand legal community and 
is ‘less likely to result in unduly strained 
interpretations being given to legislation’ 
(paragraph 4.110). The report provides no 
justification whatsoever for the inclusion 
of this clause in the draft bill, apart from 
the earlier reference to enlivening judicial 
review. The report implies that this 
clause is not intended to support strained 
interpretations. However, the courts have 
struggled to identify the limits of section 6 
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, and 
while the status quo (R v Hansen [2007] 
3 NZLR 1) may seem stable this is by no 
means set in stone. The British experience 
is not encouraging. 
The clause does not apply to legislation 
that pre-dates the bill until ten years after 
its commencement. When the interpretive 
direction applies to legislation that post-
dates the bill, the courts ‘will be considering 
a legislative text which has already been 
considered in terms of compatibility with 
those principles by’ legislators and officials 
(paragraph 4.113). Therefore, ‘this is likely 
to substantially reduce the prospect of 
interpretations being given to legislation 
that are contrary to the understanding of 
the Minister and public entities proposing 
the legislation’. The taskforce’s concern to 
protect the understanding of legislators 
is laudable but hard to square with the 
generality of the principles the report 
affirms. This interpretive direction would 
pressure the courts to prefer their view of 
sound policy to that of Parliament. 
The interpretive direction is not 
limited to principles (a)–(h). The courts 
must prefer a meaning of legislation that 
is consistent with all four principles of 
‘Good law-making’, three of which the 
taskforce elsewhere notes are unsuitable 
for judicial consideration. The interpretive 
direction requires legal argument and 
judicial decision on these very issues. I 
expect this is an oversight. Even if the 
direction were limited, however, it would 
be very likely to undermine the clarity 
and stability of statute law, because the 
principles (subject to reasonable limits) 
are extremely vague. Further, as with 
section 6 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act (Drew v Attorney-General [2002] 1 
NZLR 58), empowering statutes may be 
read to authorise only reasonable limits 
on liberty, or to entail compensation 
for impairment of property, or not to 
authorise any regulation that fails a cost-
benefit analysis. This interpretive approach 
will destabilise regulations as law, for they 
will be subject to invalidation at any time 
on vague grounds.
The report makes clear, at paragraphs 
4.114 and 4.130, that the point of the ten-
year delay in applying clause 11 (and 
clause 12) to legislation that pre-dates the 
bill is to give legislators and their advisors 
sufficient time to review and update the 
statute book. The implication is that 
after ten years it is sound for the courts 
to adopt novel meanings that depart from 
the understanding and intentions of the 
relevant law maker. On the taskforce’s 
understanding, clause 11 of its draft bill 
constitutes a contingent amendment of 
all statutes that pre-date the act. The bill 
amends every such statute to the extent 
that the courts can give a novel meaning 
to the legislation that is consistent with 
the principles of responsible regulation (as 
the courts understand them). Parliament 
should not amend legislation in this 
reckless way. 
Conclusion
The bill is hostile to our democratic 
constitutional order. Many of the principles 
it affirms are heterodox and should not 
be justiciable. The principles jointly 
form a vague and distorted code for law 
making, which judges will have authority 
to interpret and to specify. The bill 
politicises chief executives, enabling them 
to undermine ministers. It also authorises 
courts to review the detail of policy, 
illegitimately constraining Parliament 
and calling into question the validity of 
delegated legislation. Parliament should 
not disrupt the constitution by enacting 
this bill.
The bill politicises chief 
executives, enabling them 
to undermine ministers. 
